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Women and the 
Constitution 
On October 2nd, 1980, the Government of 
Canada made public its "Proposed Resolution for a 
Joint Address to Her Majesty The Queen respect-
ing the Constitution of Canada" and four days later 
introduced into the House of Commons the Con-
stitution Act, 1980. A Special Joint Committee of 
the Senate and of the House of Commons on the 
Constitution of Canada was established to hear 
representations from the people of Canada on the 
proposed changes. The response to the proposals 
was immediate and overwhelming, causing the 
government eventually to agree to lengthen the time 
available for the hearings. The women of Canada 
had not been consulted during the drafting of the 
proposals and it was very apparent that many of our 
concerns would not be furthered or protected by the 
proposed constitutional changes. 
It is probably true to say that most women were 
unaware of the government's intent to revise the 
constitution at this time and unaware of the 
significance of the proposed changes for them. A 
conference organized by the Canadian Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women, which was to be 
held in October 1980, was designed to inform and 
educate women about the constitution and its im-
pact upon them. Owing to a strike by the govern-
ment translators, the conference had to be cancelled 
and rescheduled for February, 1981. This February 
conference also did not take place, however, as a 
majority of the Council's members agreed with the 
minister responsible for the status of women, the 
Honorable Lloyd Axworthy, that to hold such a con-
ference at this time could be potentially embarrassing 
for the government. Such a view was contrary to that 
expressed by the president of the council, Doris Ander-
son, who resigned in protest over the council's decision. 
The only national conference on women and constitu-
tional change was held on February 14th, 1981 in Ot-
tawa and was organized by an ad hoc group of women. 
The constitutional debate has raised many questions 
about women's participation in and relation to the 
political process. The three briefs presented below 
reflect the major concerns of women with respect to the 
initial constitutional proposals and the changes 
necessary to fully ensure and protect women's rights 
within Canada. 
WOMEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
CONSTITUTION. SUBMISSION OF 
THE CANADIAN ADVISORY COUNCIL 
ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN TO THE 
SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION, NOVEMBER 18, 
1980 
W e welcome this opportunity to place before 
you these submissions on the Proposed Resolu-
tion for a Joint Address to H e r Majesty the 
Queen respecting the Consti tution of Canada . 
Patriation of the Canadian Consti tution is a 
significant landmark in the history of our 
nation. W e hope that this expression of our 
concerns and interests wi l l aid in your 
deliberations. 
The Canadian Advisory Counc i l on the 
Status of W o m e n was created in 1973, pur-
suant to a recommendation made by the R o y a l 
Commiss ion on the Status of W o m e n . It has 
four full-time members and 27 part-time mem-
bers chosen from all parts of Canada, with a 
varied background of professional and volun-
teer concerns. Its mandate is to br ing before 
the government and the public matters of in -
terest and concern to women and to advise the 
Min is te r on such matters relating to the status 
of women as the Min is te r may refer to the 
C o u n c i l or as the Counc i l may deem ap-
propriate. In furtherance of its responsibilities, 
the Counc i l has published over sixty studies, 
including briefs and comments on the federal 
legislative program i n areas of human rights, 
c r iminal law, federal appointments, and In-
dian women—all areas which wi l l be affected 
by the proposed Charter of H u m a n Rights and 
Freedoms. 
In recent months, we have been devoting 
considerable attention to the process of con-
stitutional renewal in Canada . Th is summer, 
we commissioned thirteen studies on Women 
and the Const i tu t ion , 1 both to inform our own 
members and also to encourage the women of 
Canada to become involved in this issue which 
has a far-reaching impact on our lives and 
those of generations to come. Some of these 
papers in their original or summary form have 
been widely distributed. W e have received 
over eight thousand letters from all parts o f the 
nation in response, a clear sign that Canadian 
women feel themselves vitally affected by the 
present constitutional developments. Although 
we do not claim to be speaking as the direct 
agent of those women who have made their 
views known to us, by letter, phone, and in 
person, we are satisfied that our remarks here 
today reflect the concerns which have been ex-
pressed to us. 
O u r submissions are directed solely toward 
the proposed Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act , 
1980. 
W e wish to begin by emphasizing that we 
are in favour of the principle of entrenching in 
our constitution protection for our basic rights 
and freedoms. In the first instance, the Charter 
wi l l be a signal and guide to legislatures. It is 
highly desirable to guarantee that certain fun-
damental rights and liberties wi l l not suffer 
legislative curtailment or interference. A s 
women, we are only too familiar with legislated 
inequality. W e know only too well that our 
present B i l l of Rights is unable to stop 
discrimination when it is embodied in legisla-
t ion. 
We welcome as well the fact that the Charter 
of Rights wi l l apply to the provinces and 
territories and to the federal government. The 
incumbent provincial governments have 
publicly affirmed their commitment to fun-
damental values dur ing recent debate on con-
stitutional renewal. W e are aware, however, 
that governments do not have a guarantee of 
perpetual power. Past experience has shown 
that the elected governments of provinces are 
certainly not immune from committ ing 
breaches of our liberties. 
A t present, the courts have a considerable 
role in determining the meaning and the con-
stitutionality of legislation, by reason of their 
power of interpretation and of their role as ar-
biters of the Consti tution. There has been con-
cern expressed about the amount of power 
which would be given to the courts by an en-
trenched charter: it has been said that they 
would be called upon to play a greater political 
role since they would be interpreting the 
general principles of any constitutional char-
ter . 2 There is also some concern that the courts 
have not demonstrated an ability to give 
satisfactory meaning and content to the 
freedoms and rights stated in the Canadian B i l l 
of Rights and equivalent provincial legislation. 
In our view, it is of paramount importance 
to ensure that the wording used i n the Charter 
wi l l provide such clear directions to judges that 
they cannot possibly misinterpret the intended 
content and meaning. 
We wish to stress, however, that our support 
for the principle of entrenchment does not 
mean that we approve of every aspect of the 
proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
There has been a question in the past about the 
Courts ' capacity to strike down legislation it 
might find contrary to the standards in the 
Canadian B i l l of Rights . W e think that en-
trenchment, in particular Section 25 of the 
proposed Charter, makes it clear that the 
Courts may render such legislation inoper-
ative. Whether they wi l l depends on their view 
of the standards to be applied. W e doubt 
whether anyone can be satisfied that a com-
plete qualitative change in our Courts ' ap-
proach wi l l come about unless we put in the 
Charter new and strong standards of equality 
against which the Courts wi l l test legislation. 
Sec t ion 15 
This section is intended to be the main 
guarantee of what the title refers to as " N o n -
discrimination R i g h t s " . W e do not think that 
the guarantee is strong enough, for a number 
of reasons. 
The first clause of subsection 15(1) states 
"Everyone has the right to equality before the 
law . . . " In cases involving section 1(b) of the 
present Canadian Bill of Rights this phrase has 
been interpreted by our Supreme Cour t of 
Canada to mean "equali ty in the administra-
tion of the l a w " . 3 It does not prevent 
inequality that is built into legislation, as was 
only too clearly shown i n the Bedard and Lavell 
cases. 4 By itself, then, this phrase is not an 
adequate guarantee. Because the reference to 
"equali ty before the l a w " in section 15 of the 
Charter is accompanied by a phrase different 
from that which accompanies it in section 1(b) 
of the Canadian B i l l of R i g h t s , 4 3 we must 
carefully examine this new formulation to see 
whether it can avoid the unacceptable in -
terpretation which section 1(b) gave rise to. 
The goal of the section, according to the 
Minis ter of Justice, is to "wipe ou t" discr imin-
ation on the basis, for example of sex, race, 
colour or ethnic o r i g i n . 5 That , then, is the 
standard against which its terms must be 
measured. 
The second part of subsection (1) guarantees 
"the equal protection of the law without 
discrimination because of race, national or 
ethnic or ig in , colour, rel igion, age or sex" . 
Th i s language is a change from our present 
Canadian Bill of Rights, which provides only that 
persons are entitled to "the protection of the 
l a w " . 6 There was a particular reason for add-
ing the word " e q u a l " to the guarantee. T h e 
purpose is not elaborated upon by the govern-
ment in connection with the present Charter , 
but we can see what it is i f we go back to 
remarks made by the Min is te r of Justice in 
1978. 
In 1978, the federal government introduced 
B i l l C-60 , the Consti tutional Amendment B i l l , 
1978. L i k e the present proposal, this earlier 
b i l l provided for "equal protection of the 
l a w " . 7 
The Honourable Otto L a n g , then Min is te r 
of Justice, stated that "equal protection of the 
l a w " could mean that "every individual is en-
titled to the same protection under the law 
without unreasonable discrimination on any 
basis" . H e further stated that the guarantee 
would mean "that a law cannot apply in a 
discriminatory manner unless such discr imin-
ation is found to be justifiable in the com-
munity 's interest on the basis of a reasonable 
classification tes t" . 8 
T h e significance of this approach has been 
pointed out by Professor Baines. B y using 
language similar to that of the 14th A m e n d -
ment of the Un i t ed States Consti tut ion, the 
drafters of the proposed Charter are hoping to 
encourage the use in Canada of Amer ican 
jurisprudence on "equal p ro tec t ion" . 9 
W e have no confidence that the simple ad-
di t ion of one word , " e q u a l " , w i l l signal our 
Courts that they should adopt Amer ican 
jurisprudence. So far, the Supreme Cour t of 
Canada has refused to adopt Amer ican pr in-
ciples when interpreting our Canadian B i l l of 
R i g h t s . 1 0 The Justice Minis te r ' s opinion of the 
effect of the change cannot, under our rules of 
argument and evidence, be cited to the Court 
i n an attempt to persuade it. 
Furthermore, we do not think that simply 
resorting to Amer ican jurisprudence wi l l 
necessarily ensure a vigorous and effective sec-
tion 15. 
W e can appreciate why the Amer ican ap-
proach might be seen as desirable. Its basic 
features have a great deal of merit. T o begin 
wi th , the Amer ican approach to equal protec-
tion ensures equality not just in procedural 
rights but also in the substance of the l a w . 1 1 
Under the present interpretation of the 
Canadian B i l l of Rights only equal procedural 
r ights—"equali ty in the administration of the 
law"—are insured. W e approve of the attempt 
to guarantee equality in the substance of the 
law as well as in its procedure. 
A second most valuable feature of the 
Amer ican approach to equal protection is the 
basic recognition that making distinctions be-
tween groups of people is an inevitable part of 
the legislative process. Not all laws apply or 
can apply to all persons. O n the other hand, it 
is recognized that some bases for drawing these 
distinctions are proper and some are not. We 
do not, for example, protest when members of 
the judic iary are denied the right to vote. W e 
would protest i f all unemployed persons were 
prevented from voting. A m o n g the improper 
bases for distinction, some are more improper 
than others. T h e jurisprudence developed 
around the 14th Amendment to the U . S . C o n -
stitution has included methods for determining 
which bases are improper, and for assessing 
the level of impropriety. 
Roughly speaking, the assessment method 
works something like this. O n the one hand, a 
basis for drawing distinctions in law may be 
seen as " i n v i d i o u s " or "inherently suspect". 
Laws based on such classifications are subject 
to strict scrutiny, and only a showing by the 
government of some "compel l ing state in -
terest" would justify legislation in which per-
sons are categorized on that basis. In the 
present state of Amer ican jurisprudence, race 
is regarded as such a suspect classification. 
O n the other hand there are those bases of 
distinction which are not inherently suspect. In 
determining the validity of legislation based on 
this k ind of distinction, the Courts ask whether 
it is "reasonable". If there is a reasonable 
relationship between the classification chosen 
and the purpose of the legislation, the courts 
wi l l uphold it. This is sometimes called the 
reasonable classification or reasonableness 
principle. Th is test is not a very strenuous one. 
It has been pointed out that between 1937 and 
1970, the Uni ted States Supreme Court used 
this test to sustain the constitutionality of all 
but one state statute challenged under the 
"equal protection" c lause. 1 2 Earl ier in history, 
" r a c e " was regarded as a classification which 
could be supported on a "reasonableness" 
basis, although, as pointed out above, it has 
since been classified as "suspect", and made 
subject to stricter scrutiny. 
W e can suggest that moving from a "rea-
sonableness" test to holding a classification 
"inherently suspect" shows an increase in 
societal disapproval of the sort of discrimin-
ation involved. 
This relatively sophisticated approach to the 
assessment of legislation appeals to us. The 
remarks of Justice Minis ter L a n g , quoted 
above, show an inclination to adopt only one 
part—and the least effective part, at that—of 
the approach to "equal protection" developed 
in the Uni ted States. W e think that this would 
be a mistake. A single standard wi l l be too 
blunt—or too ineffective—an instrument to 
cope with a variety of different kinds of 
discrimination. 
O n the other hand, to adopt the present 
Amer ican jurisprudence in all its ramifications 
would not be a satisfactory solution either. The 
Amer ican Supreme Court has not yet reached 
a clear understanding on how " s e x " as a basis 
of classification should be regarded. In one 
case, some justices recognized that distin-
guishing between persons only on the basis of 
sex is, like race, invidious or inherently 
suspect. 1 3 It sometimes still considers a sex-
based classification to be justifiable on a mere 
showing that it is reasonable. 1 4 M o r e often, the 
Cour t occupies a middle position, adopting 
what has been called a " m i d - t i e r " or " m u l t i -
t i e r " approach to sex d i sc r imina t ion 1 5 " S e x " 
is the only ground of discrimination which is 
treated i n this somewhat confused fashion. 
W e see no need to import into our law this 
Amer ican muddleheadedness. Canadian theo-
ry is, we submit, ahead of the Americans on 
this point and it is our approach which should 
be incorporated in our Charter . 
O u r Pr ime Min is te r has put the position 
very clearly. Some types of discrimination are 
more invidious than others, and these are the 
ones based on race and sex. H e has stated: 
"Perhaps this generation has recognized 
as past generations have not that 
discrimination based upon sexual or 
racial reasons lasts for a lifetime. There 
are, after a l l , only two permanent con-
ditions attributable to human beings. 
One is sex. The other is race. A l l other 
distinctions from which discrimination 
may grow are temporary i n nature or are 
subject to change. Educat ion, religion, 
language, age, health, economic statures, 
experience—all are or can be transient. 
Discr iminat ion based upon sex or racial 
origin is thus doubly unfair. The person 
against whom the discrimination is prac-
tised had no choice of or igin and has no 
option of change. 1 6 
There is, then, no reason to accord those suf-
fering from sex discrimination a lower order of 
redress than that given the victims of race 
discrimination, as is the case in the Uni ted 
States. 
Accordingly, we propose that subsection 15 
(1) be replaced by a new subsection 15 (1), 
reading as follows: 
15 (1) Every person shall have equal rights 
i n law including the right to equality 
before the law and to the equal 
protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) Such equal rights may be abridged or 
denied only on the basis of a 
reasonable distinction. Sex, race, 
colour, national or ethnic or ig in , and 
religion wi l l never constitute a 
reasonable distinction except as 
provided in subsection (3). 
W e think that this formulation has a number 
of advantages. It begins with an explicit 
statement of equal rights, one that wi l l linger in 
the memory and perform the educational func-
tion desirable in a Charter . It preserves the 
guarantee of equality in the administration of 
the law. The last phrase is balanced so that a 
Cour t wi l l not think that only "protect ive" 
laws are to be extended equally. The guarantee 
of "equali ty before the l a w " and "the equal 
protection and benefit of the l a w " are stated to 
be included i n "equal rights in l a w " . The i n -
troductory phrase is thereby, we hope, made 
flexible enough to allow considered judicial ad-
justment of rights to meet changing conditions. 
Subsection (2) reflects the idea that some 
bases—i.e. the enumerated ones—will never 
be acceptable as reasons for making distinc-
tions in law. These grounds are thus put, by 
reason of the Charter , in a position somewhat 
l ike the suspect classification of the Amer ican 
jurisprudence, although we think that the 
protection for the individual is somewhat 
stronger. The Charter would, to use words 
Ch ie f Justice Lask in has applied to the B i l l of 
Rights , " i tself enumerate prohibited classifi-
cations which the judiciary is bound to 
respect" . 1 7 O u r list of prohibited or suspect 
classifications does include more than " r ace" 
or " s e x " : we believe that these few additions 
reflect Canadians ' views about what sort of dis-
cr iminat ion is most grave. 
The legislator would have freedom to make 
distinctions on bases other than those enumer-
ated in subsection 15 (2), but those bases would 
still have to be reasonable ones. Th is aspect of 
our formulation allows the Courts to recognize 
that in a particular case, it would be 
unreasonable to make distinctions in law on 
the basis, say, of age, or marital status, even 
though the Charter does not contain an explicit 
prohibit ion of such distinctions. 
W e have removed the term "d i sc r imin-
a t i on" from our proposed section. We believe 
that its use suggests that individuals must be 
adversely affected before they can invoke the 
equality guarantee. W e think that this leaves 
too much leeway for highly subjective 
judgments about what is and is not an adverse 
effect. The Supreme Cour t in R . v . Burnshine,18 
for example, thought it beneficial for a young 
offender to be incarcerated a year and a half 
longer than an adult would be for the same of-
fence because his chances of rehabilitation 
were thereby increased. M a n y would disagree 
with that view. 
Last ly, we think that the title of section 15 
should reflect the positive, symbolic content of 
its introductory words: we propose " E q u a l 
R i g h t s " as a substitute for "Non-d i s c r imin -
ation R i g h t s " . 
Sec t ion 15(2) 
Subsection 15(2) of the proposed Charter is 
designed to permit legitimate programs for the 
benefit of disadvantaged groups, thus prevent-
ing them from being ruled inval id on account 
of subsection (1). 
W e think that this is an important principle. 
A constitution by itself cannot eradicate past 
injustice: legislative activity by both the federal 
and provincial governments is necessary. W e 
think that it is extremely important to 
recognize the continuing role of " o r d i n a r y " 
human rights legislation and similar statutes 
by bui lding into the Charter of Rights an area 
within which they wi l l operate. 
W e are of the view, however, that subsection 
15(2) as it now stands, has some deficiencies. 
First ly, its protective sweep is not l imited to 
programs sanctioned by a legislature. By using 
this section, private employers might try to 
justify their own measures for giving preferen-
ce to one group. W e think that only programs 
authorized through legislation should be 
protected. 
Secondly, the section refers only to the 
"disadvantaged". It makes no reference to the 
prohibited grounds (sex, race, etc.) set out i n 
subsection 15(1). W e think this phrasing is too 
broad. Affirmative action and s imilar 
programs are very strong measures, with ef-
fects both on the groups benefited and on the 
groups not benefited. W e definitely think that 
these programs should be used to redress the 
effects of past discrimination, but we do not 
think that such programs should be in -
discriminately available. They would be so 
available under the present wording. For 
example, a group that could show "disad-
vantages" because of inabili ty to attend 
private school might successfully argue that a 
program designed for its benefit does not 
violate subsection 15(1), even though such a 
program denied opportunities to blacks, In-
dians or women. O n the other hand, 
proponents of a plan designed for the benefit of 
Indian people would have to prove to a Cour t 
that these people are actually disadvantaged in 
order to claim the protection of subsection 2 as 
it is now worded. Problems abound in such a 
requirement: would everyone benefited by a 
program have to be "disadvantaged"? T o 
what extent? B y what standard? 
The danger is that some groups with a real 
need for positive programs would lose out in 
two ways. Firstly, because of technical 
requirements of proof, programs for their 
benefit would be declared unconstitutional. 
Secondly, they could be denied employment or 
other opportunities by some program designed 
for a group with a less well-founded but more 
easily proven "disadvantage" and this denial 
of opportunity could not be prevented by sec-
tion 15. 
W e propose a change in the subsection. O u r 
draft subsection, numbered 15(3) to ac-
commodate our previous numbering change, 
is: 
15 (3) Noth ing in this Charter limits the 
authori ty of Par l iament or a 
legislature to authorize any program 
or activity designed to prevent, 
eliminate or reduce disadvantages 
likely to be suffered by any group of 
individuals when those disadvantages 
are related to the race or sex of those 
i n d i v i d u a l s , o r to the other 
unreasonable bases of distinction pur-
suant to subsection (2). 
Its wording is, to some extent, based on the 
language of section 15 of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act. W e think that this level of detail is 
necessary. It is similar to that of other sections 
of the draft Charter dealing with group rights: 
see, for example, section 23, dealing with 
minori ty language educational rights. O u r sec-
tion restricts the availability of the protection 
to programs dealing with correction of the 
results of race and sex discrimination, or 
discrimination based on the other unreason-
able bases set out in subsection 15(2) or found 
by a Cour t pursuant to that subsection. 
Sec t ion 29 
W e note with considerable dismay the three-
year morator ium on implementation of section 
15. The rationale for delaying implementation 
for three years is to give the governments time 
to br ing the laws into accord with the Charter 's 
requirements . 1 9 W e do not think this is a val id 
reason. T o begin wi th , the Report of the R o y a l 
Commiss ion on the Status of W o m e n , 2 0 issued 
ten years ago contained an extensive inventory 
of required reforms to promote equality in the 
law for women. The Canadian Advisory 
Counc i l on the Status of W o m e n has prepared 
a second report, entitled Ten Years Later,21 
which shows that progress in changing the law 
has been slow, even though government has 
long been aware of what is required. Simi lar 
reports on necessary changes in law to remove 
discrimination exist in the provinces . 2 2 O n the 
basis of these reports we believe an omnibus 
bill to achieve conformity with the Charter 
could be prepared and tabled in no more than 
six months. These laws should have been 
changed long ago. The only way to promote 
government action is to remove the 
moratorium. 
Moreover, it is the government's own 
judgment that will decide which laws will be 
amended to bring about compliance with sec-
tion 15. The government may believe that a 
particular law does not offend the section. 
Others may well have a different view. For 
example, the government stoutly maintained 
in the Bedard and Lavell case that section 
12(l)(b) of the Indian Act did not deny equality 
before the law to Indian women. Moreover this 
law still has not been changed, even though the 
Honourable Mr . Chr6tien declared on Oc-
tober 6 that " A s a Government, we now con-
sider ourselves morally bound by the non-
discrimination provisions of the Charter... " 2 3 
The moratorium means that it will be at 
least three years from patriation before a per-
son can challenge in Court the government's 
judgment that some law is not in violation of 
section 15. We already know about numerous 
laws which we think violate section 15, and 
know of the hardship these violations cause. 
Section 15 Court proceedings will devour fur-
ther years. Even assuming that necessary facts 
and witnesses can be assembled after a three-
year delay, the moratorium means that some 
will experience more than a three-year wait for 
justice. This is surely unconscionable, and ex-
tremely incongruous given the haste with 
which the government is proceeding with the 
rest of the resolution. 
Section 29(2) should be completely removed 
from the Charter. 
Section 24 
This section seems designed to protect those 
i ights and freedoms not explicitly dealt with in 
the Charter. Its closing phrase guarantees 
"any rights or freedoms that pertain to the 
native peoples of Canada''. 
In the Bedard and Lavell case, it was held that 
differential treatment of Indian women who 
married non-Indians was justified because it 
was a matter relating to the internal gover-
nance of Indians on Reserves, Reserves being 
among the rights vouchsafed to the Indian 
people by the British North America Act.24 
We are unsure whether section 24 of the 
proposed Charter will justify other dif-
ferentiations between Indian women and men, 
on the basis of real (or imagined) customs, 
rights, or ancient freedoms. 
To clarify the position, we would like to see 
added at the end of section 24 the phrase: 
" . . . provided that such rights or freedoms 
pertain equally to native men and women". 
Section 26 
This section of the Charter preserves the 
power of Parliament and the legislatures to 
make rules respecting the admissibility of evi-
dence in any proceeding. It also states that no 
provision of the Charter, except section 13 
dealing with self-incrimination, would affect 
the laws of admissibility of evidence. 
We are concerned about the impact of this 
section on the guarantees in section 15, which, 
at the very least, does deal with equality in the 
administration of the law. Does it mean that 
there can properly be different provisions con-
cerning the admissibility of testimony of a 
woman and a man, an Indian and a non-
Indian, a religious person and an agnostic? 
Certainly members of this Committee wi l l 
be aware of our long-standing interest i n en-
suring that laws about admissibility of eviden-
ce i n cases of sexual assault are not based on 
sexual stereotypes, and do not unfairly 
prejudice the v i c t i m . 2 5 
A bias against women in the laws of evidence 
could prejudice the fair trial of the issue. 
W e ask that the section be amended so that 
its introductory words are: 
N o provision of this Charter , other than 
sections 13 and 1 5 . . . 
Section 3 
This section guarantees certain polit ical 
rights "without unreasonable distinction or 
l im i t a t i on" . W e are not convinced that this 
qualifying phrase need be so broad. W e are 
sensitive to a period in our history when 
women were denied the franchise and the right 
to stand for public off ice. 2 6 W e remember that 
members of racial minorities have suffered the 
same fate. 2 7 Exclusions from the vote because 
of religion or insufficient property qualifi-
cations were familiar features of early English 
history. 
W e think that section 3 should include, after 
" . . . l im i t a t i on" , the phrase "established in 
conformity with section 15 . . . " . T h e 
prohibited bases for distinction set out in sec-
tion 15 would thereby be incorporated as for-
bidden bases for denying the right to vote and 
hold office. There may be reasons, like youth-
fulness, or serious mental incapacity, why the 
franchise might be withheld. W e do not think, 
however, that race, sex, national or ethnic 
or ig in , or religion should ever constitute a 
reason for denying to a citizen the right to vote 
or hold office. 
The Person 
The Charter deals with rights which i n -
dividual persons have vis-a-vis government ac-
t ion. W e think that the language of the Charter 
should emphasize this point. 
The present draft uses "Everyone has . . . " 
as the customary way of beginning a section. 
The French language version is ' 'Chacun a . . . " 
" O n l y when there is some special l imitat ion 
on the right is a different-formula used: for 
example, sections 3 and 6 begin " E v e r y cit izen 
has . . . " 
The present Canadian B i l l of Rights , on the 
other hand, refers to "the right of the individual 
to life, l iberty, security of the person . . . " , "the 
right of the individual to equality before the law 
. . . " , and restrictions on the authority of the 
state to "compel a person'' or "deprive a per-
son", and so on. 
W e would like to see each section which now 
begins with " E v e r y o n e " be changed, so that it 
begins " E v e r y person"; in French, the phrase 
could be ' 'Toute personne". 
Section One 
W e have left until last comment about one of 
our most grave reservations about this 
proposed Charter of Rights . 
Section one is, to be succinct, deplorable. In 
our view, i f section one is allowed to continue 
in its present form, there is no point in having 
the rest of the Charter. O u r liberties and rights 
wi l l be in greater jeopardy while "guaranteed" 
by a Charter containing section one than ever 
they have been. 
The section states that the guarantees of our 
rights and freedoms are "subject only to such 
reasonable limits as are generally accepted i n a 
free and democratic society with a parliamen-
tary system of government ' ' . 
Th i s exception is a contradiction of the 
whole idea behind a Charter of Rights . A 
l imitat ion which is "generally accepted" i n a 
society wi th a parliamentary system of govern-
ment is, essentially, a l imitat ion which has the 
acceptance of a majority. Protection of 
minorities against the actions of the majority is 
the very cornerstone o f our c iv i l liberties, 
enunciated as such by J o h n Stuart M i l l : 
The w i l l of the people, moreover, prac-
tically means the w i l l of the most 
numerous or the most active part of the 
people; the majority or those who succeed 
i n making themselves accepted as the 
majority; the people, consequently, may 
desire to oppress a part o f their number; 
and precautions are as much needed 
against this as against any other abuse of 
power . . . and i n polit ical speculations 
"the tyranny of the major i ty" is now 
generally included among the evils 
against which society requires to be on its 
g u a r d . 2 8 
T o say that we wi l l l imi t our liberties in ways 
that have majoritarian approval from time to 
time is to say that our Charter is hollow. 
There are further grave difficulties with the 
suggested approach. U n d e r the system 
established by the Char ter , the Cour t is to say 
when a law is inconsistent with the Charter 
and, by operation o f section 25, the law is 
inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency. 
A Cour t may thus come to assess whether a 
particular limitation on our liberty is per-
missible under section one. T h e standards by 
which a Cour t can determine this question wi l l 
be difficult to develop. A n y piece o f legislation 
l imi t ing our liberty wi l l have been passed by a 
majority of members of Parliament or the 
legislature in question. Yet , the Cour t wi l l be 
invited to say that this does not mean that the 
l imitat ion is "generally accepted in a free and 
democratic society with a parliamentary 
system of government". It w i l l be invited i n ef-
fect to say that it knows more about ac-
ceptability in a parliamentary system than does 
a Parliamentary majority. 
It may well be that a Cour t would be so 
daunted by this prospect that few, i f any, 
limitations on our liberties would ever be ruled 
inoperable. O u r Courts have long functioned 
wi thin a tradition o f "Par l iamentary suprema-
c y " , a principle which holds that the 
legislature is the ultimate arbiter o f what is 
legal and acceptable. The provisions of section 
one may invite the Courts to continue to 
respond to the rule of Parliamentary suprema-
cy, and uphold virtually every l imitat ion on 
freedom enacted by a legislature. In that event, 
only limitations imposed i n regulations or 
other non-parliamentary sources of law would 
ever be seriously scrutinized. Section 25, i n -
deed the whole Charter, would be deprived of 
al l meaning. 
O n the other hand, the Courts might be 
vigorous in scrutinizing limitations on the 
terms of the Charter, even when those 
limitations were imposed by legislative 
majority. Parliament would doubtless be 
wounded by any intimations i n this scrutiny 
that its actions are unfree, undemocratic, or 
unparliamentary. Section one might thus 
precipitate needless, and sharp, conflict be-
tween the Courts and the legislature. The risks 
of such conflict are twofold. The Courts may 
be so wary of it that they wi l l adopt an ex-
tremely cautious approach to interpreting the 
Charter . In the alternative, they may 
strategically "p ick their fights", r isking outcry 
only when the values at stake are ones they 
prize most highly. T h e n , in truth, the Cour t 
would be radically altering the intention 
behind the Charter to safeguard all the 
enumerated rights and freedoms. 
W e cannot ignore the purpose behind sec-
tion one. In part, it must be to provide the 
Courts with leeway in interpreting the Char-
ter, so that problems posed by absurdities and 
absolutes can be resolved. W e believe that the 
rules of interpretation developed over the cen-
turies wi l l continue to assist the Cour t to avoid 
absurdities, injustice, and anomalies, even 
without a clause like section one. 
In part, the section is probably designed to 
allow limitations on our liberties, i n the public 
interest, dur ing a national crisis. W e must 
sound a r inging note of caution, however, at 
using such a sweeping section to achieve this 
purpose. 
One commentator said with reference to the 
predecessor of the present section one, section 
2 5 o f B i l l C - 6 0 : 
"Provisions similar to section 25 of B i l l 
C-60 serve as the constitutional basis for 
some of the more authoritarian and anti-
human rights conduct which the world 
has witnessed since the Second W o r l d 
W a r . Provisions similar to section 25 
have p r o v i d e d the cons t i tu t iona l 
authority of Idi A m i n to pursue the ac-
tivities he has, for Indira Ghand i to i m -
pose authoritarian government in 1976, 
and for the Government of Bangladesh to 
impose martial law on August 25, 1975. 
Examples can be found in other C o m -
monwealth constitutions and in the ex-
periences of other Commonweal th coun-
tries such as Sr i L a n k a , Cyprus , Niger ia 
and Malays i a . Also note that the Soviet 
Constitution has a similarly worded 
provision (along with an "entrenched" 
B i l l of Rights) . Surely the experiences of 
these countries renders section 25 of B i l l 
C-60 suspect i f one is to take the ob-
jectives of B i l l C-60 at face value. " 2 9 
It may be noted that section 25 contained 
explicit, i f wide, phrases describing when liber-
ties could be cur ta i l ed . 3 0 Section one is far 
more general. 
If it is regarded as necessary to provide for 
curtailment of liberty in times of national 
crisis, we ask that the grounds for such cur-
tailment be precisely and narrowly articulated. 
T h e philosophy behind permitt ing such cur-
tailment should also be expressed: we l imi t 
some liberties so that al l our fundamental liber-
ties might, in the end, flourish. Both these 
stipulations are necessary so that there is clear 
and forceful guidance to the Courts . 
For a model of a desirable provision, we 
draw upon the International Covenant of C i v i l 
and Poli t ical Rights , to which Canada is a 
signatory. W e propose that the provision be 
part of section 29, dealing with the application 
of the Charter . W e do not think it desirable to 
have the limitations on our liberties take pride 
of place i n section one. 
In lieu of the present section one, we 
therefore propose a simple statement of pur-
pose, which would appear as section one: 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees to every person the 
rights and freedoms set out i n it. 
T h e n we propose the addition to section 29, 
i n place of the present subsection (2), the 
following: 
29 (2) In time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially pro-
claimed, Parliament may authorize 
the temporary restriction of certain 
rights and freedoms to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation and i n a manner that the 
other rights and freedoms set out in 
this Charter wi l l be preserved; 
provided that such restrictions shall 
not involve discrimination solely on 
the ground of race, colour, sex, 
religion or ethnic or ig in . 
(3) N o derogation from sections 2(a), 3, 
7, 12, 14, 16-22 and 23 is permissible 
under subsection (2). 
O u r proposed subsection (3) stipulates those 
liberties which should never be curtailed, even 
in times of emergency. The list closely parallels 
that in the International Convent ion . The 
protected liberties are: freedom of conscience 
and religion, the right to vote and hold office 
(assuming that elections have not been post-
poned pursuant to section 4), the right to life, 
l iberty and security of the person and the right 
not to be deprived thereof except in accord 
with principles of fundamental justice, protec-
tion from cruel and unusual punishment, the 
right to a translator in proceedings, the right to 
use of the official languages, and right to 
education in the chosen official language. 
Moreover , the proposed subsection (2) reflects 
our view that denial of equality on the basis of 
race, colour, sex, religion or ethnic or igin can 
never be justified, even in emergencies. 
Summary of Recommendations 
Accordingly , we most respectfully submit 
that the following changes be made to the 
present Charter , and that this Committee ap-
prove the entrenchment of the Charter i n its 
revised form. 
O u r proposed changes are: 
Section 1 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms guarantees to every person the 
rights and freedoms set out in it. 
Section 3 
Every citizen of Canada has, without 
unreasonable distinction or l imitat ion, 
established in conformity with section 15, the 
right to vote in an election of members of 
the House of Commons or of a legislative 
assembly and to be qualified for mem-
bership therein. 
Section 15: Equal Rights 
(1) Every person shall have equal rights 
in law including the right to equality 
before the law and to the equal 
protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) Such equal rights may be abridged or 
denied only on the basis of a 
reasonable distinction. Sex, race, 
colour, national or ethnic or igin , and 
religion wi l l never constitute a 
reasonable distinction except as 
provided i n subsection (3). 
(3) Nothing in this Charter limits the 
authority of Par l iament or a 
legislature to authorize any program 
or activity designed to prevent, 
eliminate or reduce disadvantages 
likely to be suffered by any group of 
individuals when those disadvantages 
are related to the race or sex of those 
i n d i v i d u a l s , or to the other 
unreasonable bases of distinction pur-
suant to subsection (2). 
Section 24 
The guarantee in this Charter of certain 
rights and freedoms shall not be con-
strued as denying the existence of any 
other rights or freedoms that exist in 
Canada , including any rights or freedoms 
that pertain to the native peoples of 
Canada; provided that such rights or freedoms 
pertain equally to native men and women. 
Section 26 
N o provision of this Charter, other than 
sections 13 and 15, affects the laws 
respecting the admissibility of evidence in 
any proceedings or the authority of 
Parliament or a legislature to make laws 
in relation thereto. 
Section 29(2) 
Section 29(2) should be completely 
removed from the Charter. 
Section 29 
(2) New Rewording of Section 1 
In time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation and the 
existence of which is officially 
p r o c l a i m e d , P a r l i a m e n t m a y 
authorize the temporary restriction of 
certain rights and freedoms to the ex-
tent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation and in such a manner 
that the other rights and freedoms set 
out in this Charter wi l l be preserved; 
provided that such restrictions shall 
not involve discrimination solely on 
the ground of sex, race, colour, 
religion or ethnic or ig in . 
(3) N o derogation from sections 2(a), 3, 
7, 12, 14, 16-22 and 23 is permissible 
under subsection (2). 
General clause 
Each section which now begins with 
"everyone" should be changed so that it 
begins ' ' Every person ' ' . 
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W o m e n could be worse off i f the proposed 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms is entrenched 
in Canada's Constitution. Certainly, the pre-
sent wording wi l l do nothing to protect women 
from discriminatory legislation, nor relieve in -
equities that have accumulated in judic ia l deci-
sions. 
Differences between the life patterns of 
women and men have not been considered by 
the drafters of the proposed Charter. W e ask 
you to look at the new Charter in a different 
way, from the perspective of over half the peo-
ple of Canada, to see its deficiencies and con-
sider amendments to affirm and protect the 
fundamental rights to equality of women with 
men. 
The National Act ion Committee on the 
Status of W o m e n is a voluntary organization 
working to improve the status of women in 
Canada. N A C is an umbrella for more than 
150 non-governmental organizations across 
the country—some regional, others Canada-
wide. It promotes reform in laws and public 
policies, informs the public about women's 
concerns, and fosters cooperation among 
women's organizations. 
N A C held a public forum on the Consti tu-
tion in Toronto on October 18, 1980, the 
recommendations from which were considered 
by the Executive and form the basis of this 
brief. Notably, it was agreed that we support 
entrenchment of a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in principle. However , Part 1 of the 
Constitution Ac t , 1980, would be acceptable 
only i f amendments are made to Sections 1, 
15(1) & (2), 24 and 29(2), and a new section on 
the Supreme Cour t . 
W e remind you that N A C has already in-
formed the Min is te r of Justice of its opposition 
to moving divorce from federal to provincial 
jurisdiction. N o r do we address the division of 
powers which has wide application especially 
in the area of social services. W o m e n have en-
countered difficulty by interminable referrals 
back and forth because of federal-provincial 
sharing of responsibility for financing and ad-
ministration. 
S C H E D U L E B 
C O N S T I T U T I O N A C T , 
1980 
P A R T I 
C A N A D I A N C H A R T E R 
O F R I G H T S A N D 
F R E E D O M S 
Guarantee of Rights and Freedoms 
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees Canada 
the rights and freedoms set 
out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits as are gen-
erally accepted in a free and 
democratic society with a 
parliamentary system of gov-
ernment. 
The opening section under Guarantee of 
Rights and Freedoms falls short of the pr inci-
ple we would expect. Imprecise wording in the 
limitations clause (bold type ours) could open 
the way to a variety of interpretations of per-
mitted exceptions. Indeed, the potential for 
dr iv ing a truck through led participants at our 
conference to dub it "the M a c k truck clause." 
Failure to clarify the guaranteed rights and 
freedoms by removing the l imi t ing clause 
would render useless subsequent sections. 
A . N A C PROPOSES T H A T T H E G E N -
E R A L L I M I T I N G C L A U S E B E D E -
L E T E D . 
If there have to be restrictions on rights and 
freedoms i n time of war, these should be 
specified, as well as those rights and freedoms 
not to be abridged under any circumstances. 
B . N A C R E C O M M E N D S T H A T R I G H T S 
A N D F R E E D O M S N O T T O B E 
A B R I D G E D U N D E R A N Y C I R C U M -
S T A N C E S , S H O U L D I N C L U D E , A T 
L E A S T , T H E R I G H T N O T T O B E 
S U B J E C T E D T O A N Y C R U E L A N D 
U N U S U A L T R E A T M E N T O R P U N -
I S H M E N T A N D T H E H U M A N 
R I G H T T O E Q U A L I T Y IN T H E L A W . 
Non-discrimination Rights 
15. (1) Everyone has the Equality 
right to equality before the iTwTnd" 
l aw and to the equal protection e q u a l 
1 * protection 
of the law without discrimina- oftiwiaw 
tion because of race, national 
or ethnic o r ig in , colour , 
religion, age or sex. 
(2) Th i s section does not pre- Affirmative 
elude any law, program or ac- " r "° r n a m s 
tivity that has as its object the 
amelioration of conditions of 
d isadvantaged persons or 
groups. 
"Equa l i t y before the l aw ' , (bold type 
ours)—the wording proposed in the govern-
ment's Charter of Rights , and used in the pre-
sent Canad ian B i l l of Rights , has been inter-
preted to mean only that laws, once passed, 
wi l l be equally applied to all individuals in the 
category concerned. The law as written could 
discriminate against women, which is neither 
just nor acceptable. The courts have been con-
cerned with maintaining the just administra-
tion of the law, but not with discrimination 
built into the law itself. Thus the Supreme 
Cour t of Canada decided against Lavel l and 
Bedard, two Indian women who lost their 
status on marriage to non-status men. I f the 
present wording prevails, there is no guarantee 
that Indian women wi l l not continue to be 
denied equal rights with Indian men. 
C . N A C R E C O M M E N D S A M E N D M E N T 
T O P R O V I D E F O R E Q U A L I T Y IN 
T H E L A W S T H E M S E L V E S , AS 
W E L L AS IN A D M I N I S T R A T I O N O F 
T H E L A W S . 
Better still would be a statement that equali-
ty is a positive objective, and requiring an 
'evening-out' process towards its achievement. 
Th i s would be consistent with the view that 
freedom from discrimination is a positive 
human right women are entitled to enjoy. It 
would discourage a narrow interpretation of 
equality and prevent objections to affirmative 
action programs which could lead to costly, 
time-consuming litigation. 
D. N A C R E C O M M E N D S A N E W 
C L A U S E T O SPECIFY T H E H U M A N 
R I G H T T O E Q U A L I T Y AS A POSI-
T I V E O B J E C T I V E . 
E . N A C R E C O M M E N D S T H A T T H E 
SPECIFIED C A T E G O R I E S IN SEC-
T I O N 15(1) BE A M E N D E D T O IN-
C L U D E M A R I T A L S T A T U S , SEX-
U A L O R I E N T A T I O N A N D P O L I T I -
C A L B E L I E F . 
In view of the Stella Bliss case especially, it is 
clear that more specific directions need to be 
given to the courts for the interpretation of 
equality. Notably it is necessary to specify that 
discrimination on the basis of sex is proscribed 
whether the law discriminates against all 
women or only some of them. 
F. N A C R E C O M M E N D S T H E 
A D D I T I O N O F A N E W C L A U S E T O 
S E C T I O N 15 SPECIFYING T H A T 
D I S C R I M I N A T I O N O N T H E BASIS 
O F A SPECIFIED C A T E G O R Y IS 
P R O S C R I B E D W H E T H E R A L L 
M E M B E R S O F T H A T C A T E G O R Y 
A R E A F F E C T E D OR O N L Y S O M E . 
Part 1, Section 15(2) (above) 
W e believe this clause on affirmative action 
programs is intended to include women, but 
nowhere is this expressly stated. Given the 
sorry records of the courts on women's rights 
cases, this is not a matter to be left to jud ic ia l 
discretion. Should affirmative action programs 
be established we do not want to have to spend 
years in court proving their legality. 
G . N A C R E C O M M E N D S A D D I N G T O 
S E C T I O N 15(2) T H E WORDS " I N -
C L U D I N G W O M E N . " 
Application of Charter 
29. (1) This Charter ap-
plies: 
(a) to the Parliament and gov-
ernment of Canada and to all 
matters within the authority of 
Parliament including all mat-
ters relating to the Y u k o n Ter-
ritory and Northwest Terri tor-
ies; and 
(b) to the legislature and gov-
ernment of each province and 
to all matters within the au-
thority of the legislature of each 
province. 
(2) Notwithstanding sub-
section (1), section 15 shall 
not have application until 
Applications 
of Charter 
three years after this Act, ex-
cept Part V , comes into force. 
N o delay should be necessary in the applica-
tion of (1) and (2) (bold type ours) of Section 15 
(above). Advisory Counci ls on the Status of 
W o m e n have the necessary inventories of rele-
vant legislation requiring up-dating which 
could be proceeded with immediately. 
H . N A C R E C O M M E N D S T H A T S E C T I O N 
29(2) B E D E L E T E D . 
Part 1, Sections 24 and 25 





24. The guarantee in this 
Charter of certain rights and 
freedoms shall not be construed 
as denying the existence of any 
other rights or freedoms that 
exist in Canada , including any 
rights or freedoms that pertain 
to the native peoples of 
Canada . 
General 
25. A n y law that is i n -
consistent with the provisions 
of this Charter is, to the extent 
of such inconsistency, inopera-
tive and of no force or effect. 
Sections 24 and 25 of the proposed Charter 
actually threaten to entrench unequa l rights 
for native women. Unde r the present Indian 
Act men are given special rights to pass on In-
dian status to a non-Indian spouse and their 
children, while native women are denied the 
same ability. Indian women indeed lose their 
Primacy of 
Charter 
status on marriage to a non-status spouse, and 
cannot regain it, even on divorce or widow-
hood. T h e spouse of a status man , by contrast, 
retains Indian status even i f the marriage is 
dissolved. Entrenchment of the rights and 
freedoms now existing for the native people 
could be interpreted to mean entrenchment of 
special rights to native men and their denial to 
native women. 
I. N A C R E C O M M E N D S A M E N D M E N T 
T O S E C T I O N 24 B Y A D D I N G " P R O V I -
V I D I N G T H A T A N Y S U C H R I G H T S OR 
F R E E D O M S A P P L Y E Q U A L L Y T O NA-
T I V E M E N A N D T O N A T I V E 
W O M E N . " 
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F C A N A D A 
Decisions as to what rights and freedoms 
Canadian women wi l l enjoy wi l l continue to be 
made by the courts, and ultimately by the 
Supreme Cour t of Canada . Yet , the Supreme 
Cour t of Canada decided: 
— that women were not persons—the 
famous 1928 Persons' Case; 
— that d i sc r imina t ion against Indian 
women in the Indian Ac t does not violate 
'equality before the l aw ' ; 
— that Stella Bliss was not discriminated 
against because she was a woman, but a 
pregnant person; 
— that, again in the Bliss case, there was no 
discrimination because not a l l pregnant 
women were denied benefits under the 
Unemployment Insurance Ac t ; 
— and that Irene M u r d o c h had no cla im to a 
share in the ranch on which she had, for 
20 years, done the haying, raking, 
swathing, mowing, driven the horses and 
tractors, and dehorned, vaccinated and 
branded the cattle, as well as kept house 
and raised four children, because she had 
done "no more than what a normal farm 
wife would d o . " 
A representative number of women on the 
bench is not just a demand for symbolism— 
that women and men are equal—nor for career 
opportunities—although women deserve the 
same chance at judic ia l appointments and pro-
motions as men. V e r y practically, numbers 
count The decision on Lavel l and Bedard was 
by a 5-4 majority in the Supreme Cour t of 
Canada. Altogether, 14 judges ruled on these 
cases—8 in favour o f the women's argument, 5 
against, and 1 did not decide on the equality 
aspects. Clear ly , the appointment of even 1 or 
2 women to the Supreme Cour t of Canada 
could have made a difference in these crucial 
women's rights cases. 
A t present, 3 out of 9 places on the Supreme 
Cour t of Canada are allocated to Quebec 
because it is accepted that judges without ex-
perience in c ivi l law should not be deciding 
c iv i l law appeals. Should the same argument 
not hold for women's appeals, if not on 
grounds of socialization, gender identity and 
roles, then on the actual record of male judges 
in women's rights cases? 
J . N A C R E C O M M E N D S A D D I T I O N O F 
A N E W S E C T I O N T O G U A R A N T E E 
T H E A P P O I N T M E N T O F A REP-
R E S E N T A T I V E N U M B E R O F W O M -
E N T O T H E C O U R T S , I N C L U D I N G 
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F 
C A N A D A . 
The consistent use of the word "everyone" 
throughout the Charter, concerns us. " E v e r y 
person" would be more specific, since "per-
s o n " as used in the B . N . A . Act , has been 
clearly defined by the Courts in the Persons 
Case. 
K. N A C R E C O M M E N D S R E P L A C E -
M E N T O F T H E W O R D " E V E R Y -
O N E " W I T H " E V E R Y P E R S O N " 
T H R O U G H O U T T H E C H A R T E R . 
T o sum up, in order for the Charter to pro-
vide unmistakably for the human right to 
equality for every person in Canada, in-
cluding women, key changes are required in 
Section 1, Section 15(1) and (2). Amendments 
proposed in Sections 24 and 29 (2) contribute 
to the same end. These changes are required to 
protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
all people in Canada, of women and men, in 
their encounters with government and each 
other. 
T H E A D H O C C O M M I T T E E 
O F C A N A D I A N W O M E N 
C O N F E R E N C E O N 
C A N A D I A N W O M E N 
A N D T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N 
F E B R U A R Y 14 A N D 15 1981 
R E S O L U T I O N S A D O P T E D 
A T T H E C O N F E R E N C E O N C A N A D I A N 
W O M E N A N D T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N 
I. R E S O L U T I O N S PASSED O N T H E 
C H A R T E R O F R I G H T S A N D 
F R E E D O M S : 
B E I T R E S O L V E D : 
that this Conference endorse in principle the 
concept of an entrenched Charter of Rights as 
per the recommendations passed February 14, 
1981 and that unless the Charter reflects the 
amendments made here today, that it not be 
included in the submission to the Brit ish 
Government in order to provide time to in -
corporate these amendments, 
that failing the full adoption of our amend-
ments, incorporation of a Charter of Rights be 
accomplished by a constituent assembly of 
50% women. 
R E Q U I R E D A M E N D M E N T S : 
Clause 1 a statement of purpose should 
be added providing that the 
rights and freedoms under the 
Charter are guaranteed equally 
to men and women with no 
limitations 
any l imitat ion to clause (1) 
should follow the format and 
content of Art ic le 4 of U . N . In-
ternational Covenant on C i v i l 
and Poli t ical Rights 
the word " p e r s o n " should be 
used throughout the Charter , 
i n lieu of any other word 
denoting human being 
Clause 7 That clause 7 be amended to 
include the right to reproduc-
tive freedom 
? that clause 7 be amended to i n -
clude the right to equality of 
economic opportunity 
Clause 15 that the list of prohibited 
(1) grounds of discrimination in 
clause 15 (1) be amended to i n -
clude: (1) mari tal status (2) 
sexual orientation (3) political 
belief 
that clause 15 contain a two-
tiered test recognizing that 
there shall be no discrimination 
on the basis of sex, race, re-
l ig ion, colour, national or 
ethnic or ig in , mental or phys-
ical disability, age, mari tal 
status, sexual orientation, and 
political belief, and that there 
be a compell ing reason for any 
distinction on the basis of sex, 
race, rel igion, colour, or na-
tional or ethnic or ig in , sexual 
orientation or political belief 
Clause 15 affirmative action programs 
(2) under clause 15 (2) should 
apply only to disadvantaged 
groups as listed under clause 15 
(1) and not to individuals. E x -
planatory note: it is our opin-
ion that individuals who are 
members of disadvantaged 
groups benefit under the pro-
grams listed above 
Clause 26 clause 26 on mult iculturalism 
be dealt wi th i n the preamble 
Clause 29 the three-year morator ium for 
(2) the implementation of clause 
15 be deleted from the Charter 
III . PROCESS O F C R E A T I N G T H E 
C O N S T I T U T I O N 
Whereas the process of creating our Const i tu-
tion has been done in great haste and does not 
adequately reflect the needs of women, 
B E I T R E S O L V E D : 
that the Women 's Conference on the Const i tu-
tion insist on a full and fair debate in Par l ia -
ment on the Constitutional package before it, 
and oppose any use of closure on that debate. 
T H E A D H O C C O M M I T T E E O F 
C A N A D I A N W O M E N 
F E B R U A R Y 15, 1981 
O T T A W A 
B E I T R E S O L V E D : 
that this meeting approves the principle of 
equitable representation of women throughout 
the polit ical system. In the case of appoint-
ments to the Upper House, Boards, C o m m i s -
sions and the Bench women should have equal 
access to appointments and positions and hold 
at least half the positions at al l levels. 
II . R E S O L U T I O N PASSED O N T H E 
C O N S T I T U T I O N 
B E I T R E S O L V E D : 
that the women of this Conference support 
br inging home the Consti tut ion with an 
amending formula. 
